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SETTING THE SCENE:
NON-STATE COLLECTIVES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Much new work on the making and unmaking of empires has exposed
the pivotal role of companies and “private” actors with complex
relationships to states and sovereigns.1 Yet trading companies and other
commercial entities were not the only “corporate” formations stalking
imperial sovereignty and its dismantling.
When empires end, to whom or what do they pass sovereignty? The
difficulties associated with this deceptively simple question are baked into
Copyright © 2018 Natasha Wheatley
∗
Princeton University.
1. For the making, see, e.g., STEVEN PRESS, ROGUE EMPIRES: CONTRACTS AND CONMEN IN
EUROPE’S SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (2017); PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE
SOVEREIGNTY & THE EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA (2011); ADAM
CLULOW, THE COMPANY AND THE SHOGUN: THE DUTCH ENCOUNTER WITH TOKUGAWA JAPAN (2014);
Andrew Fitzmaurice, The Justification of King Leopold II’s Congo Enterprise by Sir Travers Twiss, in
LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITISH COLONIAL THOUGHT: TRANSPOSITIONS OF EMPIRE 109–26 (Shaunnagh
Dorsett & Ian Hunter eds., 2010). For the unmaking, see, e.g., Susan Pedersen, Getting Out of Iraq—in
1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood, 155 AM. HIST. REV. 975, 975–1000
(2010); Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy,
and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 513, 514 (2002).
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the concepts used to describe and justify the process itself – especially the
“right to self-determination.” An international right to self-determination
presumes the existence of an international “person” to whom such a right can
attach: yet the very premise of a claim to self-determination is that
international personhood has been unjustly denied to the community in
question up to that point. The right thus seems to imply the existence of a
shadowy, pre-state, corporate thing with some sort of inchoate standing in
international law, even as it is simultaneously premised on the non-existence
of this same thing.2
When the Eurasian land empires collapsed at the end of the First World
War, and a new order based on “self-determination” was proclaimed, this
“thing” or juridical person was colloquially understood to be a “nation.”
Were “nations” legal persons of a sort, capable of possessing international
rights? However dubious in theory, this construction proved even less
plausible when applied to the actual successor states of the Habsburg Empire,
which emerged onto the international stage riddled with as much ethnic
diversity as the empire itself.
To complicate matters further, the new states of Central and Eastern
Europe were saddled at birth with international treaties that safeguarded the
rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities residing within their
borders. If the new minorities protection regime thus undermined the idea of
a single, state-forming nation by acknowledging the fragmentation of the
body politic, it re-introduced the question of the international legal
personhood of ethnic groups on a sub-state scale.3 Under the treaties, ethnic
minorities seemingly possessed international rights: did that not imply that
these collectives were corporate legal persons under international law,
separate from the states in which they lived? Today we think of the interwar
minorities regime as an era of innovative group rights which subsequently
gave way to an alternate system built on individual rights in the wake of the
Second World War.4 Yet it was the very “groupness” of those interwar rights
that aroused endless controversy and dissent while they were in operation.
2. See generally Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and
International Law, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 51 (1988).
3. The connection between self-determination and minorities rights are more complex (both for
actors at the time and historiographically) than I can discuss here. Some interwar jurists, for example,
understood minority rights as compensation metered out in cases where full self-determining statehood
was not possible. See, e.g., CARL GEORGE BRUNS, GRUNDLAGEN UND ENTWICKLUNG DES
INTERNATIONALEN MINDERHEITENRECHTS: EIN UEBERSICHT 16 (1929); JACOB STOYANOVSKY, THE
MANDATE FOR PALESTINE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
MANDATES 54 (1928).
4. On the mid-century tussle between individual and collective rights, see generally, among
others, Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950, 47 HIST. J. 379 (2004);
PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET: ON THE ORIGINS OF “GENOCIDE” AND “CRIMES AGAINST
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In what follows, I use the legal fogginess of these collective rights as an
historical opening – a kind of historiographical sticky spot that leans in to a
series of different conceptualizations and periodizations. It prompts us to
think about minority rights not “forwards,” through a comparison with
postwar international human rights, but “backwards,” through a deeper
imperial genealogy. The whole question of the juridical subjectivity of ethnic
groups was, it turns out, an old and weary theme in the Habsburg lands, one
that knots the history of international law back into that of imperial
constitutional law. This longer regional history changes both sides of the
story, reciprocally: if it allows us to re-“place” or re-ground this chapter of
the history of international law, and counter international law’s cultivated
placelessness, it also exposes the experimental visions of “international” law
coursing through the veins of imperial jurisprudence.
I.

A MAGNA CARTA FOR EAST CENTRAL EUROPE (OR, THE
PROBLEM WITH THE LEAGUE’S MINORITIES TREATIES)

Looking eastwards from his perch at the University of Vienna in 1937,
Alfred Verdross thought he knew how to soothe the region’s unrest. A
former Kelsen student, the distinguished Austrian jurist had made his name
in the years after World War One by extending the monism of the Vienna
School to the sphere of international law. Disquiet in East Central Europe,
he now argued, was the inevitable result of categorical errors introduced by
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and embedded in the international
settlement it midwifed: a regime with an invisible subject, or — a system of
minorities protection in which “minorities” did not exist.
Verdross reminded his readers that the minorities treaties did not define
the concept of minority and referred only to members of ethnic, linguistic, or
religious minorities. “The positive international law of minority rights is
thereby constructed individualistically, rather than universally. Not them, but
those belonging to the minorities are awarded rights.”5 Nowhere in the
treaties did “a minority” as such possess a right. Small wonder, perhaps:
genuine rights-bearing legal collectivities raised the specter of states within
states, of unruly nested sovereignties, which representatives of the new states
predictably resisted at all costs.6 More philosophically, the construction of
ethnic/national groups as unified legal persons in possession of international
HUMANITY” (2016). On new ways of linking minority rights and group rights, see forthcoming work by
León Castellanos Jankiewicz.
5. ALFRED VERDROSS, VÖLKERRECHT 226 (1937) (emphasis in original).
6. Some early proposals for the minorities treaties recognized minorities as “distinct public
corporations.” See Nathaniel Berman, The International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal
History, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 41 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
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rights would challenge the foundations of a state-centric international law. If
minorities truly possessed international subjectivity, reasoned Rudolf Laun
– another Austrian jurist of the period – “then the whole image of the
community of international law would be essentially transformed.”7
It was this legal denial of the juridical subjectivity of the group that
Verdross understood as a major geographical-categorical error. He argued
that the premise of the treaties — that it was plausible (legally and otherwise)
to understand minorities as a collected mass of individuals — may be well
suited to West and Central Europe, but was dangerously misconceived for
the “belt of mixed peoples of the European east.” His prescription was
specific:
A pacification [Befriedung] of the European east can only be achieved if
the principle of the equal rights of ethnicities [Gleichberechtigung der
Volksstämme] laid down in article 19 of the old-Austrian constitution
regarding the general rights of citizens (1867) is elevated to the Magna
Carta of Eastern Europe.8

On the cusp of the Second World War, Eastern Europe cried out for the
resurrection of Habsburg constitutional law — at least according to
Verdross. The rights languages of the empire’s nationalities law were far
better adapted to the prose of life in this region than the misconceived
platform of individual rights cooked up and imposed through the new
international settlement. Article 19 of Austria’s last major constitution could
thus be recalled into service as a kind of supranational regional charter of
rights indigenous to the region itself.
The peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups cohabiting in close
proximity, he explained, could be achieved only if each group possessed an
equal right to the protection and cultivation of their ethnicity and language.
“But because culture is only possible in the community, mere individual
rights are not sufficient, it is far more necessary to recognize rights of the
ethnic group [Volksgruppenrecht]. Pursuant to this, the rights of minorities
must be rebuilt into the rights of ethnic groups.”9 In 1936, the nationalities
7. MITTEILUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FÜR VÖLKERRECHT: HEFT 7, 32 (1926),
http://digital.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/werkansicht?PPN=PPN860664945&PHYSID=PHYS_0005&
DMDID=DMDLOG_0001 (Rudolf Laun at the Siebente Jahreversammlung of the Deutschen
Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, in the discussion on 27 May 1926, following G. Ebers, “Sind im Völkerrecht
allein die Staaten parteifähig?”). On international legal personality in this period, see generally Natasha
Wheatley, Spectral Legal Personality in Interwar International Law: On New Ways of Not Being a State,
35 LAW & HIST. REV. 753 (2017).
8. VERDROSS, supra note 5, at 230–31 (emphasis in original).
9. Id. (emphasis in original). For a survey of the jurisprudence of “Volksgruppenrecht” in the
1920s and 30s, see Samuel Salzborn, ‘Volksgruppenrecht’: Zum Transfer(versuch) eines politischen
Paradigmas in das Europäische Minderheitenrecht, in RECHTSTRANSFER IN DER GESCHICHTE / LEGAL
TRANSFER IN HISTORY 44–63 (Vanessa Duss et al. eds., 2006).
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congress had come to the same conclusion, declaring their impatience with
individual rights and the necessity of new corporate legal bodies. “All
cultural work is communal work, all national rights are communal rights,”
the congress declared in its resolutions that year. “For that reason, a true
nationalities law that does not recognize national minorities as collective
unities and legal subjects is unthinkable.”10
Verdross was not alone in comparing the minorities treaties unfavorably
to article 19 of the old imperial Austrian Constitution.11 He shared with other
jurists of the period a frustration with the notion that his native region needed
to take legal lessons on the rights of national minorities from the Allied
powers. The Habsburg Empire had been a bustling laboratory for
conceptions and schemes of nationality rights and group legal subjectivity.
Yet as the empire collapsed at the fiery end of the world war, Austria had
been rebranded a backward prison house of nations, and its former territories
transformed into a different sort of laboratory – a testing ground and zone of
tutelage for new international rights that withheld sovereignty’s full
splendor. On the knife edge of war’s end, the region had gone from the
subject of (inter)national legal innovation to its object – a site of disciplinary
regulation and (perceived) humiliation.12 Verdross tried to square the circle
and reclaim the Habsburg lands as legal protagonists rather than guinea pigs
in the twentieth-century history of rights.
Nor was he alone in arguing that the demographic particularities of the
region required different ways of conceptualizing rights, personhood, and
sovereignty. As the Austrian historian Harold Steinacker explained in 1934,
“we have here an over-one-another rather than next-to-one-another, an
overlayering [Überschichtung] of peoples [Volkstümer].”13 What could the
one-dimensional geographies of sovereignty, or an anemic, individualized
minority regime mean in the world of this overlayering? What might

10. VERDROSS, supra note 5, at 231 (quoting Resolutions of the XII Nationalities Congress, held
in Geneva in September 1936).
11. Hans Kelsen (for example) considered rights guaranteed in the new Austria through the
Minderheitenschutz norms of the Treaty of St. Germain and observed that they did not go further than
article 19, and in fact remained a little behind, “als die Einführung einer Staatssprache ausdrücklich
zugelassen wird.” HANS KELSEN, ÖSTERREICHISCHES STAATSRECHT: EIN GRUNDRISS
ENTWICKLUNGSGESCHICHTLICH DARGESTELLT 63 (1923).
12. See Jane Cowan, Who’s Afraid of Violent Language?: Honour, Sovereignty, and ClaimsMaking in the League of Nations, ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 271, 271–91 (2003) (discussing the
Foucauldian overtones of the minorities regime).
13. Harold Steinacker, Die geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen des österreichischen
Nationalitätenproblems und seine Entwicklung bis 1867, in DAS NATIONALITÄTENRECHT DES ALTEN
ÖSTERREICH 4–5 (Karl Gottfried Hugelmann ed., 1934) (“Hier haben wir große Schwankungen der
Sprachgrenzen und des Zahlenverhältnisses in den Mischgebieten. Vor allem haben wir statt des
Nebeneinander ein Übereinander, eine Überschichtung der Volkstümer.”)
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international law look like if it was written out of that overlayering, rather
than applied from the outside and after the fact, in a doomed attempt to sort
its geological architecture into a flat legal geometry?
If we track the evolving jurisprudence of collective rights out of the
cradle of Habsburg constitutional law and into the world of interwar minority
protection, we glimpse how the problem of group legal personality
repeatedly spurred visions of alternate versions of international law
indigenous to East Central Europe. Time and again, conceptions of collective
rights spiraled off into bold re-imaginings of the very idea of international
law. If people were dispersed and mobile and layered, could law be so too?
What did sovereignty mean in such circumstances? Or territory, for that
matter? Could both be superseded? The sharp line between international and
domestic jurisdictions itself seemed part of the problem, as a string of
thinkers proposed different iterations of an “internal international law” or
“internal supranational legal order.”
II.

(GROUP) RIGHTS WITHOUT SUBJECTS (AGAIN):
THE EMPIRE’S CONSTITUTIONAL MYSTERIES

There was more than a little irony to Verdross’s impassioned recall of
Austrian nationalities law as a model for true collective rights. His invocation
depended on a certain forgetting of its own. For it was precisely the
difficulties of recognizing nations or peoples as legal persons that had
preoccupied generations of Austro-Hungarian jurists. Section 19 of the 1867
constitution had announced that all ethnicities were equal in their rights and
possessed the inviolable right to cultivate their language and nationality. But
these ostensibly collective rights lacked an obvious subject to wield them:
the law did not name, define, or constitute “ethnicities” or “nations” as legal
entities. It was precisely the gap between the formal fact of these rights and
the legal opacity of their bearers that proved such thorny (if fertile) terrain
for Habsburg legal thinkers.
Faced with this constitutional provision – which quickly became the
basis for myriad regional claims and complaints14 – many jurists threw up
their hands. The prominent Graz professor Ludwig Gumplowicz shook his
head: “‘ethnicities’ are neither physical nor juridical persons, and therefore

14. In this way, imperial law ironically played a role in producing national communities, especially
by spurring conceptions of nationality that focused on language use. See Pieter Judson, THE HABSBURG
EMPIRE: A NEW HISTORY (2016); See Tara Zahra, KIDNAPPED SOULS: NATIONAL INDIFFERENCE AND
THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN IN THE BOHEMIAN LANDS, 1900-1948 (2008).
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as such can never assert what ever rights.”15 He therefore classed this
provision as a mere general principle that could never be implemented
without further legislative elaboration. Edmund Bernatzik, another doyen of
Habsburg constitutional law, argued in parallel that nationalities could not
form legal persons because they did not have the necessary unified and
organized will. Faced with the constitution’s vague formulation, he
maintained, one must immediately ask “who then is the subject of such a
celebrated, ‘inviolable’ right, if it cannot be the nationality as such?”16 He
offered no solution to the problem.
So, these constitutionally guaranteed rights were in need of a subject.17
They populated constitutional law like ghosts: disembodied legal signs
without “persons” to carry them. Georg Jellinek could only blame the
drafting. “This article has a very unlegal style [unjuristisch stilisirt],” he
complained in 1892, “in that ethnicities that do not possess personality and
languages that could never become legal subjects are granted ‘rights.’”
Further legislative elaboration was required “to designate the legal subjects
who are to be granted an entitlement in this area.”18 Adolf Exner, a scholar
of Roman law and Rudolf von Ihering’s successor at (and future rector of)
the University of Vienna, spoke on the subject at the Wiener Juristische
Gesellschaft in 1892. “If one examines article 19, the absence of a legal
subject is already apparent. Ethnicities are not juridical persons; in the first
instance it is not even possible to objectively determine who belongs to an

15. Ludwig Gumplowicz, DAS OESTERREICHISCHE STAATSRECHT (VERFASSUNGS- UND
VERWALTUNGSRECHT): EIN LEHR- UND HANDBUCH 29 (Vienna: Manz’sche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und
Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1891).
16. Edmund Bernatzik,DIE JURISRISCHE PERSÖNLICHKEIT DER BEHÖRDEN; ZUGLEICH EIN
BEITRAG ZUR THEORIE DER JURISTISCHEN PERSONEN 100, n. 259 (Freiburg: Akademische
Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1890)
17. Gerhard Stourzh has argued that although nations were never organized into legal persons, the
rights granted under Section 19 of the Constitution did have meaning and affect, because collective claims
were brought by municipal organizations or voluntary associations, for example, that represented national
interests in a particular area even if they did not represent the totality of members of that national group.
Thus the binary between individual citizens and organized nationalities fitted out with representative
organs does not capture the political reality of old Austria. See Gerald Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung
der Volkstämme als Verfassungsprinzip 1848-1918, in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, vol. 3., Die
Völker des Reiches, part 2, 1149-57 (Adam Wandruszka & Peter Urbanitsch, eds., 1980). We could say
that these were surrogate or placeholder legal personalities, that could treat the issues in a piecemeal
fashion, local case by local case, rather than dealing with the question more structural legal terms for the
empire as a whole. Of the new work on Habsburg nationalities law, see Börries Kuzmany, Habsburg
Austria: Experiments in Non-Territorial Autonomy, 15 ETHNOPOLITICS 43, 43−65; Jeremy King, The
Municipal and the National in the Bohemian Lands, 1848-1914, 42 AUSTRIAN HISTORY YEARBOOK 89,
89−109 (2011).
18. Georg Jellinek, SYSTEM DER SUBJEKTIVEN ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTE 94 (Freiburg: Akademische
Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr 1892).
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ethnicity.”19 Its “true nature,” he argued, was that of a “promissory law
[Verheißungsgesetzes].” The word “inviolable” already pointed one in that
direction. “Every right can be violated. But if it says in the state fundamental
law that a right is inviolable, then that is a self-limitation on the will of the
state [des Staatswillens], not a guarantee of individuals against a legal
injury.”20 The state was speaking to itself, not ascribing rights to others.
Exner’s solution to the specter of rights without subjects was to “discover”
that the rights themselves did not exist in the first place: article 19 in fact
housed the duties of the state rather than the rights of nations.
Others found the notion of ethnicities/nations as legal persons far less
perplexing. The great proponent of national federation and Czech politician
František Palacký considered the problem at length. He later recounted that
already in his famous letter to the 1848 Frankfurt parliament he had
interpreted “each of the peoples [Völker], in the genetic meaning of the word,
as particular personalities [besondere Persönlichkeiten],” with the right of
association (Associationsrecht) as their primary means of protection. “The
ideas already existed; all difficulties concerned simply the embodiment
[Verkörperung] and grouping of these into concrete and organic wholes.”21
How were fluid and dispersed “peoples” to be solidified into singular
subjects?
Palacký’s approach was both pragmatic and revealing. In 1866, he
ruminated on the “reality” of national groups as distinct from states:
Is each nation, in its totality, a moral and legal person, or not? I think that
at least among thinkers there can exist no controversy about that. Nations
such as, for example, Bohemians, Poles, Hungarians, Germans and so on
are genuine realities, are particular and dynamic wholes, of which each
possesses its own particular consciousness, its will, its own interests and
therefore also duties; in brief, they are real moral and legal persons.22

No one would deny, he felt, that Germans who lived in Austria, Prussia,
Russia, and France had their own common national interests and friendly
understanding, even as their respective governments may rage against one
another. If Palacký foreshadowed the irredentism of the interwar years, he
also hinted at a necessary fluidity or overlap between imperial and
international law in Central Europe:
That the theory of international rights in the above described sense of the

19. Adolf Exner, Subjective Rechte aus Artikel 19des Staatsgrundgesetzes über die allgemeinen
Rechte der Staatsbürger, 49 JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER 583 (1892).
20. Id. at 584.
21. František Palacký, POLITISCHES VERMÄCHTNISS 15 (Theodor Mourek ed., 2nd ed.1872) (“Die
Ideen waren ziemlich früh vorhanden; alle Schwierigkeiten drehten sich nur um die Verkörperung und
Grupirung [sic] derselben zu einem konkreten und organischen Ganzen.”).
22. Id. at 14.
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different ethnicities has not yet been developed, must obviously be
attributed to the circumstance that scholars working on these rights,
Englishmen, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Italians, and Germans, live in such
lands in which the concepts “nation” and “state” more or less coincide.23

He mused that the intellectual energy of his countrymen had been caught up
elsewhere — in Slavic philology and the exact sciences. Had they turned
their minds to nationalism and legal theory instead, he speculated, there
would be a far more developed jurisprudence on the international rights of
nationalities — rights that transcended sovereignty and attached to human
groups rather than state borders; rights that were jurisdiction-queer. As
viewed from the multiethnic polities of central Europe, international law
would (and should) look quite different. As the century drew to a close and
even more so after the empire collapsed, Central European jurists would
develop precisely such a nuanced jurisprudence of (inter)national rights.
III. PERSONALITY EXPLODING GEOGRAPHY:
WE NEED A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW…
Visions of new sorts of national rights that attached to peoples rather
than territories bubbling up from Habsburg jurisprudence achieved a global
fame as the platform of the Austro-Marxists (especially Karl Renner and
Otto Bauer) at the turn of the century. But such visions had in fact entered
the bloodstream of imperial constitutional debate already at its inception
moment in the wake of the 1848 revolutions. One of the earliest proposals
for a re-ordering of the empire along national lines came from a Rumanian
delegation collectively representing Rumanians living across provincial
frontiers in Transylvania, Hungary, the Banat, and the Bukovina. In a March
1849 memoranda to the imperial government, the Rumanian delegation laid
out a detailed plan for “the amalgamation of all Rumanians of the Austrian
monarchy into a single independent nation, under the Austrian scepter, as an
integral component of the unified monarchy.”24 While stressing their loyalty
to the monarchy, they sought an “independent national administration” so
that they might exercise the right to free national development, as guaranteed
by the crown.25 This independence would pertain only to internal
administration against the other nations of the monarchy. No nation should
be subordinate to another. This principle meant that the realization of the
national equality of rights would be possible only if
each particular nation is left to group itself into a single center over and

23. Id.
24. EUGEN BROTE, DIE RUMÄNISCHE FRAGE IN SIEBENBÜRGEN UND UNGARN: EINE POLITISCHE
DENKSCHRIFT 177 (1895).
25. Id. at 181.
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against the remaining nations, roughly in the method of the ecclesiastical
organization for the members of different confessions, without
consideration of the previous provincial division, and without great
consideration for territory in general.26

Genuine equality of national rights required the old provincial borders to be
dissolved, the logic of minorities and majorities superseded and,
portentously, territory itself to fade in importance. The tyranny of geography
would no longer prevent a dispersed and intermingled population from
appearing as a single administrative unit.
The associational logic of confessional communities was likewise
invoked by the Austro-Marxists half a century later in their bold model for a
reformed imperial political structure that superseded territory altogether. In
their respective works Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie
(1907) and Staat und Nation (1899), Otto Bauer and Karl Renner famously
elaborated a federal vision for the empire built around the so-called
“personality principle.” They argued that national collectives could be
constituted non-territorially among co-nationals, wherever they happened to
live, through a curia system analogous to church membership. For all its
thickness and scope, the literature on Austro-Marxist cultural autonomy has
focused less on its place within an imperial (and subsequently international)
jurisprudence of legal personality. At its core, the personality principle in
fact constituted a discourse on the art of having rights, on making (dispersed,
overlayered) nations “visible” in law.
“As is well known,” Renner wrote, “the nations in Austria do not have
juridical personality, nor any other sort of legally graspable collective
presence. Current law does not know the nation, but rather only nationality
as a distinctive characteristic of the individual.”27 (Verdross ventriloquized
this complaint in 1937.) Yet Renner, like his colleagues, eschewed the most
obvious way of making a nation visible in law — that is, through a sovereign
nation-state. They viewed an “international legal order” based on “national
autonomy” to be a far superior model.28 To achieve this, he elaborated the
legal idea of a nation within a federally-organized Nationalitätenstaat. New
legal forms and formations (Rechtsformen) needed to be constructed for this
new “internal supranational legal order [innerstaatliche übernationale
Rechtsordnung].”29 Few models were available for the craftsmen of these
new juristische Formen. Scholars in the field should have been far more

26. Id. at 179.
27. KARL RENNER, DAS SELBSTBESTIMMUNGSRECHT
BESONDERER ANWENDUNG AUF OESTERREICH (1918).
28. Id. at 29ff.
29. Id. at 36.
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inquisitive about the wide variety of forms that state and nation might take.
It was time, Renner announced, for a new constitutional work.30
Crucially, this new work required moving beyond a liberal paradigm in
which national particularities belonged only to the individual, and beyond a
territorial understanding of jurisdiction.31 Any solution based on individual
rights was insufficient. “The national problem is not just and not in the first
instance an economic-social or a language question, but a constitutionalpolitical question that seizes the whole state organization.”32 Nations sought
a portion of the state’s functions, they wanted power. Nations must be “state
legal factors [staatliche Rechtsfaktoren], constitutional potencies or, to utter
the dreaded phrase, states within states, if peace and progress is to return to
Austria.”33 These states within states could not be built upon territorial
foundations, not only because language groups did not inhabit discrete,
hermetic areas, but also because such an approach misunderstood the nature
of nationality: an individual did not “leave” the nation when he or she left
the territory, nor did he or she “enter” it upon traversing a certain geographic
domain.34 A far more fluid solution was required, in which law attached to
people rather than land — in which jurisdiction could roam with human
bodies.
How were dispersed, mobile people to mimic the legal fixity of territory
as a jurisdiction? A nation must be transformed into an “autonomous body,
into a juridical person with its own actionable, judicially-protected
subjective rights.” In other words, it was to be become a “private and public
law person, capable of acting in law, entitled to claim and to have claims
[brought] against it.”35 Renner viewed such subjecthood as the only method
of making national rights meaningful. Like so many other Habsburg jurists
before him, Renner critiqued the legal construction of Section 19 of the
constitution that granted national rights without having organized “nations”
as legal subjects. Rights without subjects were unenforceable and thus
meaningless. In his words, the “question of the bearer of rights” lay at the
core.36
In distributing law according to demography rather than geography, the
Austro-Marxist program conjured the prospect of states without territory.
30. Id. at 38–39.
31. Id. at 40–41.
32. Id. at 67.
33. Id. at 69.
34. Id. at 74.
35. RENNER, supra note 27, at 78.
36. RENNER, supra note 27, at 118, 136 (“die Nation als freie Einheit, als juristische Person des
privaten und als Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechtes organisiert werden muss, wenn ihr in Wahrheit
die Rechte zukommen sollen, die ihr vermeint sind”).
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What were rights without land? Commentators worried about the
implications for legal theory and authority. The politician and erstwhile trade
minister Joseph Maria Baernreither was quick to identify the radical stakes
of the Austro-Marxist schema. Bauer and his colleagues, Baernreither
observed in 1910, wanted to construe nationality as a “personal union”
(Personalverband) rather than a “territorial body” (Gebietskörperschaft). If
“the nation must become a legal subject” in this way, then “a relationship
must be established between the individual national-comrade
[Volksgenossen] and the nation which is like that existing today between a
citizen and the state.”37 What is more, “this new legal subject, the organized
nation” must then possess organs so that it could make use of the rights
granted to it; one would need judges who could preside over this new area
of law. Such developments would amount to “a partial transvaluation of our
state law [Staatsrecht] into a nations law [Nationsrecht].”38 The whole basis
of constitutional law would shift. They would be states within the state — if
not against the state, Baernreither warned.
The wholesale transformation of the law of states — and the classical
distinction between municipal and international law — was in fact precisely
Renner’s point. In his own terms, this new legal order represented an
“architectonic work.”39 He conceived the autonomy program as hybrid blend
of domestic and international law — a means of inviting supranational law
into the imperial fold. As he put it in The Self-Determination of Nations with
Particular Application to Austria, perhaps the most complete articulation of
his program, published in 1918 (with a preface dated December 1917):
Incontestably, this country, despite its objectionable constitutional
backwardness in all other things, has made in this area the first and most
interesting attempts at an internal international law [innerstaatlichen
Völkerrechtes], it can count as a field of experimentation for internal
internationalism, and therefore has a high interest for legal research as well
as political praxis.40

It was the international law of the empire. Palacký’s prophesy — that a
theory of the international rights of nations would most obviously originate
in a polity like Austria-Hungary — had in some senses come true.
Through the keyhole of this alternative pre-history to the jurisprudence
of interwar minority rights, the history of international law need not
necessarily start or end with international law. Scholars who analyze the
37. JOSEPH MARIA BAERNREITHER, ZUR BÖHMISCHEN FRAGE: EINE POLITISCHE STUDIE 13–14
(1910).
38. Id.
39. RENNER, supra note 27, at 146.
40. Id. at Preface (this text was a much revised and re-titled second edition of his earlier work
RUDOLF SPRINGER, DER KAMPFDER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN NATIONEN UM DEN STAAT (1902)).
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interwar minorities regime solely within the frame and jurisdiction of
international law understandably focus on the 1878 Treaty of Berlin as the
pivotal precedent: a moment in which the Great Powers made the recognition
of new Balkan states dependent on commitments to respect minorities (albeit
of the religious rather than linguistic/national variety).41 Yet for many jurists
and public figures “on the ground” in Central Europe between the wars, the
problems raised by the minorities treaties formed a continuity with
longstanding Habsburg debates about how to turn sub-state ethnic/national
groups into units protected by law — debates that were always also about
the legal architecture and jurisdictional structure best suited to the region’s
kaleidoscopic diversity. In 1918–19, in the wake of the empire’s collapse,
that conversation migrated from the jurisdiction of imperial constitutional
law to that of international law, and the Habsburg jurisprudence on nations
as legal persons morphed into the “secondary literature” for theories of
international minority rights.42 Yet this jurisdictional mutation was not only
sequential and historical: from its inception in the Habsburg constitutional
debates of 1848–49, the question had always threatened to bend and break
traditional conceptions of jurisdiction altogether, and blur any clear line
between “domestic” and “international” domains. As Palacký and Renner
had already suggested, the creation of ethnic/national corporate bodies in
public law opened the door for those new persons to exist forever on the
threshold between “internal” and “international” jurisdictions.
CODA
…BUT NOT SO NEW AS THAT: THE NAZI CHALLENGE
The Central European story of the juridical subjectivity of nations has
an unexpected and powerful sting in its tail. In the hands of Austro-Marxists
like Renner and Bauer, the construction of non-territorial national legal
persons (within the frame of a federal imperial state) served “progressive”
ends. Yet such legal projects had no necessary political anchoring, and ended
up featuring not only in attempts to forge the Versailles order, but also to
dismantle it. While Adolf Hitler’s National Socialists may have disdained
the “juridification” of the interwar order, they too shared the crucial
assumption that an ethnic group, quite apart from any correlation with the
borders of a state, could and should be a legal subject. For them, it was the
legal subject. Volkspersonlichkeit structured the territorial map and legal
imaginary; in rejecting the empty abstraction of the state, they “turned the
41. See CAROLE FINK, DEFENDING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: THE GREAT POWERS, THE JEWS, AND
INTERNATIONAL MINORITY PROTECTION (2004); Berman, supra note 6.
42. See, e.g., Josef L. Kunz, Prolegomena zu einer allgemeinen Theorie des Internationalen Rechts
nationaler Minderheiten, 12 Z OFFENT. R, 221–72 (1932).
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folk-group into a collective legal entity.”43 Before Germany left the League,
the German diplomat Friedrich von Keller explained their position before the
League’s Sixth Committee in October 1933. Nations had “a natural and
moral right,” he held, “to consider that all its members — even those
separated from the mother country by State frontiers — constitute a moral
and cultural whole.”44 (The similarity of his statements to Palacký’s
sentiments, quoted above, is striking.) All of a sudden, the state’s
containment of legal personality — previously the bedbug of progressive
projects one and all — seemed to be a comforting convention.
The following day, the British statesman William Ormsby-Gore — a
man with paws all over the different facets of the interwar order —
passionately refuted von Keller’s presentations, especially his sketch of an
international relations founded on ethnic homogeneity, in which a state
possessed the right and duty to concern itself with citizens of other states of
the same ethnicity:
That will carry us very far. I tremble to think of the responsibilities of my
Government in respect of every citizen of the United States who claims
decent from those who went over in the Mayflower — and there are
millions — if this idea were put into operation. We reject absolutely this
conception put forward by the German delegate regarding the racial
homogeneity of political units and States. How could we do otherwise?45

Edvard Beneš, Czechoslovakia’s Foreign Minister, readily agreed with
Ormsby-Gore: “As I see it, this theory would, if carried to the extreme,
overthrow all the legal conceptions upon which not only the Minorities
Treaties, but also the international relations between States composed of two
or more nationalities, are based.”46 Unlike his Bohemian forbears within the
Austro-Hungarian empire, Beneš already had sovereign rights, which
seemed (at least until 1938!) quite hard and real. The Czechs had switched
roles: his task was now to defend the traditional order of state relations, and
the privileges of sovereignty, and certainly not to experiment with legal
subjects floating fluidly beyond state and territory.

43. Mark Mazower, Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe, 126 DAEDALUS 47,
55–56 (1997); see, e.g., NORBERT GÜRKE, VOLK UND VÖLKERRECHT (1935); Virginia L. Gott, The
National Socialist Theory of International Law, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 704 (1938).
44. Fifth Meeting (Oct. 3, 1933), Minutes of the Sixth Committee (Political Questions), Records of
the Fourteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, League of Nations Official Journal, Special
Supplement No. 120, 23 (1933).
45. Sixth Meeting (Oct. 4, 1933), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Records of the Fourteenth
Ordinary Session of the Assembly, League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 120, 35
(1933).
46. Sixth Meeting (Oct. 4, 1933), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Records of the Fourteenth
Ordinary Session of the Assembly, League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 120, 39
(1933).

